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The Influence of Social Media in
Vietnam’s Elite Politics 
Thiem Hai Bui 
Abstract: There has been a notable rise of social media in Vietnam’s 
politics in recent years. The use of social media in generating and ex-
changing content for public consumption has become increasingly com-
plex and sophisticated. The development of social media has led to the 
public being better informed about key political and economic issues of 
public concern. Social media is also playing a visible role in the competi-
tion among political factions. Increased exposure and public scrutiny has 
had a great impact on the way the political apparatus operates and the 
closed-door preparations made by party-state elites to select top leader-
ship. This paper examines the patterns of use of social media and high-
lights some of its prominent features and roles in Vietnam’s politics. I 
investigate the impact that social media exerts, as well as the constraints 
on its use for the public.  
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Introduction 
The rise of the Internet has led to social media increasingly playing a 
significant role in Vietnam’s political life. It has been instrumental in 
giving elite politics in Vietnam an unprecedented level of visibility and 
exposure to the public. As such, social media has dramatically changed 
the landscape and scope of the public sphere in Vietnam. It has provided 
a new and powerful avenue for public opinion in Vietnam, along with a 
broader range of social activism, including social media and informal 
groups and individuals acting collectively on an issue-specific basis 
(Wells-Dang 2014). The impact of social media is now recognisable in 
public responses and the way the state handles the outcomes of conten-
tious politics.  
With the rise of social media, citizens’ participation in governance 
has increasingly moved online and the initiative in social mobilisation on 
key issues of public concern has shifted away from state-linked agencies 
and media. Social media has enabled a mobilisational effect on policy 
formulation and public opinion. These developments show that the idea 
of ‘sensitivity’ regarding a number of issues is strongly conditioned on 
timing, framing, and actors’ willingness to push the boundaries of ac-
cepted speech. Terms such as ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘advo-
cacy’ – once considered off-limits – are now in normal usage, and even 
‘civil society’ is more widely used than in the past. 
In Vietnam, the use of social media as interactive forms of infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) that involve people in 
the generation and exchange content has become increasingly complex 
and sophisticated. The rising influence of social media has contributed to 
noticeable changes in political participation and usual practices. In turn, 
increased exposure and public scrutiny has resulted in noticeable changes 
in how the apparatus interacts with the public at what is now a critical 
juncture in Vietnam’s political life.  
This article adopts a qualitative method based on participant obser-
vation and in-depth interviews conducted between April and May 2015, 
which covers the period of the tree movement in Hanoi and the im-
portant political events leading up to the CPV National Congress in 
January 2016. The qualitative interviews were conducted with members 
of the press, social media users, NGO activists, and Vietnamese scholars. 
The article is also based on content analysis of websites, electronic 
newspapers, blogs, and government documents. Drawing on the net-
work society theory and actor-media theory, this article seeks to demon-
strate the many faces of social media in Vietnam in terms of how it both 
enlarges and complicates the public space. This paper focuses on the 
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impact of social media in the sphere of elite politics, which refers to the 
process of political participation and decision-making involves the more 
informed, educated and politically active people who have a strong influ-
ence in governance networks. 
Analytical Framework of Social Media’s  
Influence
The dramatic advancement of information and communication technol-
ogies has become a key factor in the development of civil society by 
providing new opportunities as well as creating new challenges. The 
Internet and social media have the agency to bring new dimensions to 
the development of civil society. According to Chang, Chu, and Welsh 
(2013: 153), the Internet and social media have three important implica-
tions for the development of civil society: (1) providing alternative 
sources of information; (2) lowering the cost of political participation; 
and (3) increasing the mobilising capacity of opposition forces. However, 
there has been an important academic debate regarding the extent to 
which social media can really facilitate political participation and enable 
the development of civil society.  
In general, the scope for collective action in Vietnam’s one-party 
system is highly limited or repressed. However, many academic works 
have recognised that the available space for citizens’ collective action 
emerged from either the dialogues with the state (Kerkvliet 2001), or 
civil society networks (Wells-Dang 2012) or the concession on the party-
state’s side on certain governance issues (Bui 2013). Now that social 
media has become part of daily life of many ordinary people, the power 
has also been organised around communicative structures that can give 
rise to social change (Castell 2009: 20). The power and counter-power 
reproduced during the interaction between cyberspace and the physical 
space has constituted the space of autonomy (Castell 2012: 222). This 
represents the hybrid space that facilitates political participation and 
enables the development of civil society.  
With regard to the meaning of the embeddedness of social life in 
the media and communication technologies, the actor–network theory 
appreciates the spatial dimension of power in the workings of the 
stretched-out networks (Cauldry 2008: 100). In this sense, the social 
media offers the networks of connections among human agents, tech-
nologies and objects. Although these connections “are contingent and 
emerge historically,” the network that they form and develop – the social 
media – can acquire the force of “nature” (Cauldry 2008: 93). However, 
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it is also important to acknowledge the limits of social media. It is very 
difficult to translate activism on social media into collective action in the 
physical space to effect some change given the strict control of the state. 
The analysis in this article concurs with the point made by Kurfürst 
(2015: 124) that the influence of social media in Vietnam has ‘yet to form 
a networked social movement’ and, to a certain extent, existing power 
differentials are reproduced in cyberspace. 
The Ascendency of Social Media in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, the existence of any opposition force is seriously questioned 
due to the thorough destruction of any independent power centres; 
which is a consequence of the Revolutionary Wars (1945–1975). Despite 
this, cyber dissent has been on the rise and is likely to become organised 
in a more cohesive way. In response, the party-state has recognised the 
importance of managing and disciplining cyber dissent. It has been able 
to adopt a combination of repressive and responsive measures to miti-
gate the adverse effects of economic mal-performance and public frus-
tration in cyberspace. These include technological measures such as 
access restriction by firewalls, filtering and list blocking, and political 
measures such as the extensive use of compliant networks and legal 
measures to force compliance (Thayer 2009; Wells-Dang 2012; and 
Kurfürst 2015).  
Vietnam has been one of the fastest growing countries in terms of 
Internet usage, both in the region and the world, with a very high Inter-
net penetration rate and youthful users.1 By the end of 1997, the Internet 
had started to become commercial in Vietnam, albeit with limited users, 
initially from state agencies. Within 15 years, the number of Internet 
users had exploded. According to the Vietnam Internet Centre under the 
Ministry of Information and Communication, 31.3 million people, or 
35.58 per cent of the country’s population, had been Internet users by 
November 2012 and this number has continued to grow.2 In 2013, there 
were approximately 20 million mobile broadband Internet users (3G 
subscribers). Most of the Internet users are young, urban, educated and 
middle class. Just as the Internet has done worldwide, Vietnamese socie-
ty is now increasingly empowered to spread information, build ties 
                                                 
1  See analysis of Digital Media in Vietnam, online: <https://wiki.smu.edu.sg/ 
digitalmediaasia/Digital_Media_in_Vietnam> (20 December 2013). 
2  VNNIC, online: <www.thongkeinternet.vn/jsp/thuebao/table_dt.jsp> (20 
October 2013). 
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among geographically separate peoples and connect them via common 
interests. However, one caveat is that citizens in Vietnam do not have 
equal access to the new technologies and the skills to fully participate in 
the political discussion in the social media. As Kurfürst (2015: 144) cor-
rectly pointed out, most social media users are among the country’s high-
ly educated and urban-based populations.  
The high level of Internet penetration in the population has had a 
number of important implications for virtual association in Vietnam. 
There are now numerous Internet communication vehicles, such as blogs, 
microblogs, social networking sites, chatrooms, emails, mailing lists, 
instant messaging, and online forums, that can be used to connect dis-
senters and distribute their opinions. The Internet and mobile phone 
data services have provided fertile ground for the blossoming blog-
osphere and cyber activism that challenge the mainstream press owned 
by the state in many significant ways. Social media users are the im-
portant target audience of the emerging players in the development of 
civil society in Vietnam, such as NGOs and independent organisations 
and informal groups that have no ties to the party-state. The new players 
have been taking advantage of the blogosphere and social media to circu-
late their contestations and dissent over governance ideas and norms. 
They include informal groups of intellectuals, retired government offi-
cials, professors, students, writers and independent activists.  
The rise of the Internet in Vietnam has been a major landmark for a 
disproportionately expanding independent cyberspace of discussion and 
deliberation. It has provided crucial support for the re-emergence of civil 
society elements in Vietnam (Bui 2013: 79–80). The Internet has in-
creased access to different sources of information and advanced freedom 
of information. In doing so, it has helped reduce the party-state’s control 
over information flows and has helped some aspects of civil society to 
thrive. There has been a marked increase in the social interactions over 
the Internet. In the context of an authoritarian state with strict control 
over physical association, the virtual association has tended to encourage 
political involvement and active citizenry as it is “typically more anony-
mous than traditional group membership, and usually is less formal” 
(Kittilson and Dalton 2008: 4). Similar observations have been made by 
other Vietnam researchers, such as Thayer (2009), Wells-Dang (2010, 
2012) and Kurfürst (2015). Anonymity and information access are 
among the important reasons why an increasing number of people have 
chosen to use Internet communication tools. 
The use of anonymity in online life also reflects societal worries, 
ranging from possible detection by the state regarding taboo issues like 
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politics, to fear of higher authorities, such as bosses, parents and teachers. 
In essence, Vietnam’s society structure has partially transposed onto the 
Internet where the older generation are less prominent than they are in 
real life.3 
Social media, particularly Facebook, is an important outlet for dis-
sent regarding the party’s control of society. According to Socialbakers, a 
social-media analysis company, the number of Facebook users in Vi-
etnam reached 22 million in 2014.4 Besides Facebook, other Vietnamese 
home-grown social networking sites like ZingMe and Go.vn have also 
had significant growth in terms of users. Blogging and microblogging are 
also very popular among Internet users. It is estimated that 3 million 
Vietnamese people have personal blogs.5  As Morris-Jung (2015: 404) 
noted, “blogging and Facebook have become increasingly important for 
expressing dissent and organizing campaigns that criticise government 
policies and challenge state authority.”  
The rising influence of social media has contributed to noticeable 
changes in public awareness and in the role of the traditional media. 
David Brown (2015) pointed to the power of the social media in “steal-
ing readers from the conventional press.” Facebook has become the 
most important and influential outlet of information. Mainstream jour-
nalists now have to rely on the key issues debated on Facebook to devel-
op their stories on the print media. A majority of the 18,000 journalists 
licensed by the state have active personal Facebook accounts and proac-
tively interact in this cyberspace. As a result, mainstream print media is 
increasingly moving online and mobile. Pressure on mainstream media is 
building in face of the challenge of losing the interest and trust of readers. 
Although the state has been seeking to promote Internet usage and 
online participation on the government-controlled websites, there is little 
evidence that the state actively invites citizens’ online participation in 
social media where the state finds it more difficult to control. Kurfürst 
(2015: 135–136) made a similar point about the two-fold response by the 
Vietnamese state to the development of digital communication.  
 
                                                 
3  Digital Media in Vietnam, see online: <https://wiki.smu.edu.sg/digitalmedia 
asia/Digital_Media_in_Vietnam> (20 December 2013). 
4  Socialbakers, online: <www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/vietnam> 
(20 September 2015). 
5  Statistics from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Report, prepared by Vi-
etnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 to be submitted to the United Na-
tions Human Rights Council. 
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Social Media as a Political Resource 
Social media has been well-received by political actors Vietnam as a use-
ful resource to tap into as they pursue their goals. They can use the inter-
active functions of the social media to generate content and public inter-
est to support their own positions and bolster their popularity. In this 
regard, Minister of Health Nguyn Th Kim Tin and the Office of the 
Government of Vietnam were among the pioneers of the use of Face-
book accounts to promote their activity to the public.  
More remarkably, social media has started playing a visible role in 
the competition among political factions as a useful political instrument. 
Social media has revealed a “sense of acute political gridlock” and “a 
bitter and uncharacteristically public proxy struggle for control over the 
party Politburo” (London 2014: 1). To a certain extent, social media 
influences public opinion by filling gaps in information provided by the 
mainstream media. Various websites and blogs have emerged with un-
known sources or owners that provide insiders’ information about im-
portant public figures and high-ranking officials, and these have attracted 
a lot of public curiosity. Although some critical bloggers have been de-
tained and arrested, the actors behind these websites have not been pub-
licly identified.  
Some interesting coincidences have emerged between the inception 
of some influential blogs and important political events in Vietnam in 
recent years. For example, Dân làm báo (Citizens’ Journalism) began go-
ing online in August 2010 when top party officials were jockeying for 
positions at the 11th Party Congress which took place in January 2011. 
Quan làm báo was established in May 2012 on the threshold on the 5th 
Plenum of the CPV Central Committee of the 11th term. This plenum 
sent signals of intensified efforts to curtail the power of Prime Minister 
Nguyn Tn Dng. At the centre of the plenum’s agenda was the review 
of the anti-corruption work and the performance of the Central Anti-
Corruption Steering Committee headed by Prime Minister Nguyn Tn 
Dng (CPV Central Committee 2012). It was decided at the plenum that 
the Central Anti-Corruption Steering Committee would undergo some 
important organisational and leadership changes. These changes were 
placed under the direct purview of the CPV Political Bureau instead of 
the Government, and the chairmanship of the Steering Committee was 
transferred from the prime minister to the party general secretary. The 
two blogs of Dân làm báo and Quan làm báo included numerous attacks on 
the prime minister. The prime minister publicly ordered the Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of Information and Communica-
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tion to investigate and take strict measures against some blogs, including 
Dân làm báo and Quan làm báo (Office of the Government 2012).  
Chân Dung Quyn Lc (‘Profiles of power’) was established in De-
cember 2014, just before the important votes of confidence on 20 top 
party officials at the 10th Plenum of the CPV (Communist Party of Vi-
etnam) Central Committee of the 11th Term, which took place in January 
2015. The blog initiated a series of corruption-related charges against 
high-profile politicians including Deputy Prime Minister Nguyn Xuân 
Phúc, Defence Minister Phùng Quang Thanh, and President of Supreme 
People’s Procuracy Nguyn Hoà Bình. The fact that the blog never pub-
lished any account of Prime Minister Nguyn Tn Dng gave rise to 
many well-founded speculations that this blog was aimed at the prime 
minister’s political opponents (BBC 2015). According to an informant’s 
estimate, approximately 70 per cent of facts and figures revealed by Chân 
Dung Quyn Lc and another site, Dân Lun, are accurate, although politi-
cal leaders have not spoken publicly or responded to information posted 
on these sites.6 Interestingly, the prime minister made a public comment 
at an official meeting in January 2015 that social media is “a necessity 
and cannot be banned”, amid some concerns raised in officialdom about 
the “poisonous” information produced by the social media, implicitly 
aimed at Chân Dung Quyn Lc. Paradoxically, Ngi Cao Tui, a newspa-
per under the management of the Elderly People’s Association, was 
immediately punished for printing sensitive facts and figures about sev-
eral high-ranking officials, including the former Government Inspector-
General Trn Vn Truyn (Minh Quang and Da Trang 2015). With the 
rise of the blogosphere, the initiative in social mobilisation on key issues 
of public concern related to elite politics, such as corruption and key 
political positions, has shifted away from mainstream state-linked agen-
cies and media.  
More recently, during the months leading up to the general election 
on 22 May 2016, many independent candidates running for seats at the 
National Assembly used social media to mobilise support for their can-
didacy. By the deadline for registration to run for seats at the National 
Assembly on 13 March 2016, there were 162 applications as independent 
candidates.7 The independent candidates were highly proactive in using 
                                                 
6  Interview in April 2015. 
7  This number dropped sharply after each consultative meeting run by the Vi-
etnam Fatherland Front to vet for candidates. After the second round of con-
sultations organized by the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), 154 individuals 
remained as independent candidates. However, at the conclusion of the third 
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Facebook and other websites to promote their political action plans to 
the public, even though the 2015 Election Law stipulates that only two 
means of election campaigning are legal. These are: (1) meeting people at 
voters’ meetings organised by the VFF, and (2) using the mainstream 
media. The use of social media for election campaigning is not men-
tioned by the law, and is therefore deemed unofficial and discouraged. 
However, the interaction and responsiveness of social media users had 
led to waves of people registering to run as independent candidates, 
which has raised serious concerns from the party-state (Tan Son 2016).  
Social Media as a Political Arena 
Social media and the blogosphere have become major battlegrounds for 
contested ideas and norms in governance. Various civil society organisa-
tions and better-informed citizens have turned to the Internet to associ-
ate virtually and articulate their demand for more effective governance 
and popular participation in policy-making. For example, NGOs such as 
ICS, iSEE (Institute for Studies of Society, Economy and Environment), 
and CECEM (Centre for Community Empowerment) have relied heavily 
on the social media to reach out to supporters and lead the campaign for 
LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) rights in Vietnam over 
the past few years. Dozens of NGOs and like-minded individuals inter-
act regularly through networks such as the Working Group for Public 
Administration Reform (GPAR), the People’s Participation Working 
Group (PPWG), and the Gender and Community Development Net-
work (GENCOMNET), with Internet platforms being the main gate-
ways for communication and discussion on social issues of immediate 
concern and reaching consensus on collective action. 
Using data from Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) to investigate re-
gime legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Chang, Chu and Welsh (2013: 153) 
observed that ‘conflicts are taking place more and more online nowadays, 
and bloggers are often the front-line combatants.’ In Vietnam, blogs, 
microblogs and social media have served as effective outlets for increas-
ingly vocal calls from the public, demanding democratic rights, the free-
dom to association, assembly, and participation in the public realm. Well-
known political blogs and websites include Anh Basam, Bauxite Viet Nam, 
Dân làm báo, and Din àn Xã h
i Dân s (Civil Society Forum). They all 
attract millions of readers and thousands of followers each day, despite 
various firewalls set up by the party-state to restrict access. They have 
                                                                                                    
round of VFF’ consultation, the final list of eligible candidates totaled 870, in-
cluding only 11 independents, who came from eight different provinces/cities. 
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stirred up a new form of political activism and added to the complexities 
of state-society relations. For example, the blog Ba Sàm (or Anh Ba Sàm) 
was started in 2007 with an aim of educating Vietnamese netizens about 
Vietnamese political, social, economic, and cultural issues from a differ-
ent perspective by publishing translations of English and French lan-
guage articles and excerpts from books or providing links to a variety of 
news sources. When Nguyn H$u Vinh, supposedly the owner of the Ba 
Sam blog, was arrested, the charges against him acknowledged that one 
microblog on the site – namely Dân Quyn (‘Rights of Citizens,’ founded 
in September 2013) – “published 2014 pieces of writing, received 38,574 
comments and got 3,243,330 access hits.” The prosecuting agency’s 
report also noted that another blog, Chép S Vit (‘Writing Vietnamese 
History,’ founded in January 2014), “published 383 pieces, received 3,401 
comments and got 480,353 access hits” (SPP 2015). Police and prosecu-
tors found that 12 articles published on Dân Quyn and 12 on Chép S Vit 
have  
untruthful and baseless content; distort the lines and policies of 
the Party and the law of the State; vilify a number of individuals 
and affect the prestige of offices and organisations; present a one-
side and pessimistic view, causing anxiety and worry, and affecting 
the people’s confidence in the leadership of the Party, the Gov-
ernment, the National Assembly, and the State of the Socialist Re-
public of Vietnam. (HRW 2016)  
As the charges against the owner of Ba Sam show, blogs like this have 
had a clear impact on the political arena of Vietnam.  
As the traditional media in Vietnam is solely owned and strictly con-
trolled by the party-state, the social media is virtually the only effective 
and practical way to navigate through the censorship and restrictions 
over the information and critical knowledge. The issues that attract the 
social media started from governance problems and mismanagement by 
the party-state regarding the economy, the environment, foreign affairs, 
the integrity of the system and officials, education, healthcare and culture. 
Initially compartmentalised in specific issue areas, these issues have 
quickly spilled over and become inter-related. A typical example is the 
establishment and development of Bauxite Viet Nam, a blog started in 
2009 as a forum to air criticisms over the party-state’s policy of bauxite 
mining in the central highlands of Vietnam, mostly on environmental 
grounds. The critiques had developed to incorporate an economic analy-
sis of costs and benefits and strategic security arguments against the 
government’s bauxite mining policy. The blog had become very influen-
tial among intellectuals and the general public, despite the party-state’s 
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determination to proceed with the project. Bauxite Viet Nam has retained 
its original title but has become a generic forum for various topical de-
velopment issues and critical governance problems.8  
The rise and fall of Quan làm báo within a short period is another no-
table case. It was launched as a forum to fight against official corruption 
amid the dramatic infightings among top political leadership in Vietnam, 
which reached its pinnacle at the 6th Plenum of the CPV Central Com-
mittee in October 2012, when the Politburo made an unprecedented 
(and ultimately unsuccessful) bid to discipline the prime minister. The 
blog had exposed detailed profiles of high-ranking officials in the Viet-
namese party-state in collusion with businesspeople who had supposedly 
been implicated in corruption. While the provenance and authenticity of 
their reports and information cannot be confirmed with certainty, they 
did trigger a lot of suspicion and distrust about top officials. In some 
particular cases, they even disclosed secrets and highly sensitive news 
that were later confirmed by the official media. At its peak, Quan làm báo 
attracted millions of regular readers and followers.  
However, the blog’s popularity among the public declined in 2013 
as the political leadership reached a certain level of compromise and the 
blog was unable to consistently report verifiable news and analysis about 
corruptible officials and their dealings. One important reason for this 
was the shift of public attention towards the process of amending the 
1992 Constitution. The Group of 72 and the Civil Society Forum occu-
pied the foci of attention from the public in 2013. These groups con-
stantly analysed and criticised the proposed amendments of the Consti-
tution made by the party-state institutions, convincingly pointing out 
various flaws in the amendments for the national development and the 
rights of people. Since the conclusion of the constitution-amendment 
process, the Civil Society Forum has sustained public interest by initiat-
ing a series of projects focusing on critical governance issues and civil 
society development.  
The Case of ‘6700 people for 6700 trees’ 
This was a case in which interested individuals and social actors came 
together around a social issue using social media to network and build 
pressure on the local government of Hanoi to stop a plan to cut down 
                                                 
8  For a recent discussion of the Bauxite Viet Nam blog, see Kurfürst (2015: 138–
139). 
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6,700 trees. It is a kind of rightful resistance in the form of environmen-
tal activism, both online and on the streets. 
 
 
Vietnamese Blogosphere Landmarks 
2001: Talawas is established and run by Writer Pham Thi Hoai (the 
website closed down in November 2010). 
2005: X-cafevn is established as an online forum and Yahoo! 360° 
launched in Vietnam. 
2006–2009: Yahoo! 360° reaches its peak in Vietnam with 2 mil-
lion users (it closed in July 2009). Anh Ba Sam in September 2007 
(Nguyen Huu Vinh and associates), Dieu Cay (Nguyen Van Hai) 
and Free Journalists Club in September 2007, Anhba Sai Gon (Phan 
Thanh Hai), Osin (Huy Duc), ‘Change we need’ in March 2009 (Tran 
Huynh Duy Thuc) use Yahoo! 360° for political blogging. 
August 2008: Decree 97 on the Management, Supply, and Use of 
Internet Services and Electronic Information on the Internet.  
Mid-2009: Bauxite Viet Nam is established by Nguyen Hue Chi, 
Pham Toan, and Nguyen The Hung. 
2009–present: Facebook is the most influential social media in Vi-
etnam and a number of other blogs have been established: Que 
Choa (Nguyen Quang Lap), Truong Duy Nhat, Nguyen Xuan Dien, 
Huynh Ngoc Chenh, M! Nm (Mother Mushroom) and Ngi Buôn 
Gió (Wind Trader).  
August 2010: Danlambao (Citizens’ Journalism) blog is launched. 
May 2012: Blog Quanlambao begins going online. 
January 2013: Group of 72 launches Petition on Constitutional 
Amendments through Bauxite Vietnam and other blogs. 
April 2013: A group of rights activists (Free Citizens Group) makes a 
call on social media for human rights picnics in May at public 
parks in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Nha Trang to discuss hu-
man rights issues.  
May 2013: Blogger Truong Duy Nhat is arrested. 
June 2013: Blogger Pham Viet Dao is arrested. 
July 2013: Vietnamese Bloggers Network and the online statement by 
130 bloggers demanding the abolition of Article 258 of the Crimi-
nal Code appear. 
July 2013: Decree 72 on the Management, Supply, and Use of 
Internet Services and Information Content Online.  
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September 2013: 130 individuals initiate ‘Dien dan Xa hoi Dan su’ 
(Civil Society Forum) 
May 2014: Blogger Nguyen Huu Vinh, who runs Ba Sam, is arrest-
ed. 
November 2014: Blogger Hong Le Tho, who runs Nguoi lot gach, is 
arrested. 
December 2014: Blogger Nguyen Quang Lap, owner of Que Choa, 
is arrested.  
December 2014: Blog Chan dung quyen luc goes online. 
January 2015: Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung publicly states 
that social media is ‘a necessity and cannot be banned.’ 
March 2015: Facebook page entitled ‘6700 people for 6700 trees’ 
created to prompt Hanoi municipal government to reverse its plan 
to cull 6700 trees. 
 
 
 
Social media has enabled those people with legitimate concerns about 
Hanoi’s environment and landscape to create a common platform to 
document the events vividly, communicate their grievances persuasively 
to a greater audience and justify their claims robustly. Le Quang Binh et 
al. (2015: 31–32) provided an account of five phases of the tree move-
ment: (1) sharing emotions and the love for trees; (2) bringing the voice 
of the people and experts to oppose the cutting of the trees; (3) calling 
for physical actions for tree protection; (4) reflecting on personal respon-
sibility; and (5) sharing information as events flow and conclude.  
In March 2015, information from credible source that the municipal 
government of Hanoi was preparing a plan to fell 6,708 trees, without 
any transparency and accountability for its actions, raised spontaneous 
reactions of anger and anxiety from various people. On 10 March 2015, 
Hanoi City’s Department of Construction released to the media a num-
ber of measures to be taken under a project entitled ‘Renovating and 
replacing city green trees for the period 2014–2015,’ approved by Hanoi 
People’s Committee. The mainstream media carried some news about 
the felling of trees along Nguyen Trai and Nguyen Chi Thanh streets, 
giving rise to public lamentations about the city’s loss of historic and 
environmental assets.  
Public concern started with some discrete voices on social media 
about this plan and its damaging effect on the environment and emo-
tional life of Hanoi people. The dynamics for the online protests gath-
ered momentum when a number of public figures and prominent intel-
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lectuals raised their voices. Tran Dang Tuan, a former senior govern-
ment official, wrote a letter to the People’s Committee of Hanoi to de-
mand that the city managers take accountability for this plan and sus-
pend its implementation. His open letter, posted on 16 March 2015, was 
spread widely on Facebook.9 Just one day later, the city government 
made its first response through the statement of Mr Phan Dang Long, 
deputy director of the Municipal Party Committee’s Propaganda Board, 
that it is not necessary to consult the people in order to fell trees. His 
statement was widely seen as indicative of the local government’s antipa-
thy to the people’s concerns and feeling of insecurity. On a separate note, 
Ngo Bao Chau, a prominent professor of math, also published an open 
letter on his Facebook page to the municipal government of Hanoi, 
raising three major issues with 10 critical questions about the problems 
of the plan. The online activism initiated by the two public figures was 
immediately supported by many other collective actions. On the forum 
for journalists, heated debates began about the serious problems of the 
plan to fell 6,700 trees in Hanoi; some mini-surveys on these fora had 
revealed massive support among journalists for the ideas of Tran Dang 
Tuan and Ngo Bao Chau.  
The strong support on social media has forced the municipal gov-
ernment to pay due attention to the issue. It was an effective answer to 
the earlier public announcement by the city officials that the people agree 
with the plan to cut down the trees. Hanoi People’s Committee Chair-
man Nguyen The Thao had to provide a response to Tran Dang Tuan’s 
open letter about the plan of cutting down the trees and asked the rele-
vant competent agencies to carefully review the plan and its implementa-
tion (Dan Tri 2015). More people had become interested in the issue and 
promptly taken to social media to vent their anger and anxiety at the plan. 
A group of interested and active citizens launched a Facebook page 
called ‘6700 people for 6700 trees,’ which provided regular updates on 
the situation and reactions from the people and the authorities. This 
Facebook page attracted widespread interactions and was followed by 
more than 80,000 users. Various people, from architects, artists and 
singers to university lecturers and students made comments on their own 
Facebook pages, electronic news portals and printed newspapers ex-
pressing their support for protecting the trees, information transparency, 
and respect for public and experts’ opinions.  
                                                 
9  On Tran Dang Tuan’s Facebook account, his open letter entry received 6,567 
likes, 789 shares and 588 comments after a few days. 
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This cyber activism was quickly translated into a form of political 
activism in the physical space. Many people, particularly young people, 
organised and participated in movements like tree hugs or tree mapping, 
tree location identification and tree protection walks. A student in Hanoi 
named Hoang Thuy Linh launched a project to protect the trees by en-
couraging people to tie yellow knots around trees to show love for them 
and express their protest against felling these trees. Participants in this 
project used Facebook to spread the message and share emotions. A 
number of journalists conducted a series of investigative reports on the 
media to expose the signs of wrong-doings by the local authorities relat-
ed to the tree replacement project and lack of accountability. A number 
of people spontaneously organised green walks and tree hug marches, 
holding up signs along Thien Quang Lake and Hoang Kiem Lake during 
March and April of 2015. These actions were quickly suppressed by the 
local authorities. Meanwhile, several lawyers – most notably Tran Vu Hai, 
Nguyen Ha Luan and Le Van Luan – started a legal battle against the 
tree-felling project. They drafted and signed an appeal for immediate 
suspension of the project, pointing out significant signs of law infringe-
ments (Cong Ly 2015). Another remarkable action was taken by some 
non-governmental organisations. PanNature (Center for People and 
Nature Reconciliation) and MEC (Center for Media in Educating Com-
munity) organised a workshop on 23 March 2015 to create a forum for 
the experts to voice their concerns to the public and media about the 
tree-felling project in Hanoi.  
The phenomenal civil society activism in this case prompted both 
the municipal government of Hanoi and the central government to re-
spond. The Government Inspectorate had to inspect the situation to 
report to the central government. As a result, a number of city officials 
were found to have demonstrated a lack of responsibility and to have 
violated current rules (Tien Phong 2015). Hanoi authorities eventually 
disciplined those officials and reversed the plan to cut down the trees. 
More importantly, Hanoi authorities had learned a lesson about paying 
due attention to and respecting people’s concerns and feelings, particu-
larly related to the transparency and accountability in the city’s projects.  
This is an interesting case of intense interaction through social me-
dia for civil society activism being used to effectively influence a deci-
sion-making process. This case exemplifies the experience of different 
forms of peaceful assembly and growing confidence of people involved 
in collective action for common interests, let alone the interests of envi-
ronmental protection.  
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Response by the Party-State to Social Media 
The party-state in Vietnam has serious concerns about its inability to 
control the influence of the social media over the public deliberation of 
governance issues through the possible use of convenient, widespread 
social networking. Although the party-state maintains firm control over 
information access and public discussion via traditional media, it has 
found it increasingly difficult to moderate content over digital channels, 
especially those related to politically sensitive issues and religious free-
dom. Nhan Dan, the mouthpiece of the party-state, cautions about the 
underground power of the social media (Anh Khoi 2012). The history of 
insurgents using innocuous Internet communication means, particularly 
in Arab uprisings in the early 2010s, has resulted in the state being more 
wary of Vietnamese political comments and content online.  
The press in Vietnam has always been considered as a strong prop-
aganda tool of the party-state. There are 812 press agencies in the coun-
try, which produce 1,084 print outlets including daily newspaper and 
periodical magazines; 1,174 news websites; and 67 broadcasting organisa-
tions that have 101 television channels and 78 radio stations.10 However, 
all of them are owned by the party-state and subject to regular instruc-
tions and direction from the Ministry of Information and Communica-
tion and the CPV Commission for Ideology, Education and Propaganda. 
All of these media outlets are supposed to act as instruments for generat-
ing and disseminating particular kind of knowledge and narratives in the 
interests of the party-state. The party-state’s propaganda and communi-
cation officials often lament that the mainstream press is falling behind 
on the information front and giving way to the citizen journalists or free 
bloggers who are more interested in the production and dissemination of 
critical knowledge, which frequently embarrass or undermine the author-
ity of the party-state.11 This situation raised grave concerns among the 
party-state about regime security on the cyber space. A high-ranking 
official responsible for information and propaganda once acknowledged 
that the party-state-sponsored press is ceding ground to social media in 
                                                 
10  Statistics from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Report prepared by Vi-
etnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 to be submitted to the United Na-
tions Human Rights Council. 
11  See <http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/chinh-tri/131596/ba-o-chi--khong-dang--ma-n 
g-xa--ho-i-se--chie-m-li-nh.html> (1 August 2016). 
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terms of reporting critical governance issues and sensitive news up-
dates.12 
The party-state’s information and propaganda sector has been trying 
to gain back ground in terms of influencing public opinion in favour of 
the party-state policies and results. The Vietnamese party-state has been 
applying numerous techniques and considering tighter cyberspace securi-
ty rules. First and foremost, the restrictions have been applied in the laws 
and decrees that are often criticised as vaguely worded, catchall and arbi-
trary. As Abuza (2015: 3) noted,  
in Vietnam, the growth of the Internet far outpaced the govern-
ment’s ability to contained it technologically – the government has 
relied instead on laws and decrees that put the onus of regulation 
and control on ISPs and content producers.  
Second, the party-state employs political influence and financial incen-
tives over networks of compliant businesses, universities, hacker groups, 
and other civil society actors to enforce its will on the Internet by techni-
cally filtering, putting up firewalls and placing certain websites on block 
lists. For example, it is widely assumed that the state is responsible for 
Facebook’s inaccessibility at times in Vietnam. The state requests coop-
eration and assistance from Internet and telecommunications companies, 
which are all either partly and/or wholly owned by the state or structur-
ally tied to the state. The communications technologies and service pro-
viders are required to provide the state’s competent agencies with the 
information they want and facilitate state surveillance through data min-
ing and information analysis on individuals’ background, history, prefer-
ences, tastes, habits, etc. In May 2013, a decision issued by the prime 
minister required foreign news channels like BBC and CNN to translate 
all of their content into Vietnamese language for the purpose of broad-
casting. Some cable service providers in Vietnam have suspended the 
broadcasting of CNN and BBC on their channels. 
The party-state has considered and implemented new restrictions on 
civil and political liberties on virtual networking, as a kind of soft repres-
sion. In April 2012, the Ministry of Information and Communication 
introduced a draft Decree on the Management, Provision, Use of Inter-
net Services and Information Content Online. In effect, the decree 
would force foreign content providers to increase cooperation with Vi-
etnamese authorities by removing content that had been deemed illegal 
                                                 
12  Do Quy Doan, vice-minister of Information and Communication, repeated his 
comment on various occasions. See <http://tuoitre.vn/Pages/Printview.asp 
x?ArticleID=529150> (20 November 2013).  
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and potentially housing data centres within the country. The decree 
would also require users to use their real names online, which could 
severely restrict free speech. In fact, hard repressive measures are also 
employed to punish those bloggers who “misuse their democratic free-
dom to infringe on the interests of the state” or “conduct propaganda 
against the state.” In July 2013, the official Decree No. 72/2013 was 
promulgated and caused an immediate outcry from human rights groups 
like Reporters without Border, the Freedom Online Coalition, and Viet-
namese bloggers. The decree prohibits bloggers and users of social me-
dia from “providing aggregated news” and imposes a number of re-
strictions on sharing and providing information. Decree No. 72/2013 
put many restrictions on circulating and aggregating news and analysis on 
the social media, with the aim of effectively eclipsing the influence of 
social media over the public. Most concerns have focused on the state’s 
attempts to exercise massive and constant surveillance over the cyber-
space to police the online population and its vague language to give al-
most blanket authority to punish any netizens at the state’s discretion. 
Decree 72 bans:  
the use of Internet services and online information to oppose the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, threaten the national security, social 
order, and safety, sabotage the national fraternity, arouse animosi-
ty among races and religions, or contradict national traditions, 
among other acts. (Article 5, Decree No. 72/2013/N-CP issued 
by the Government on 15 July 2013) 
Another strategy that has been employed is to hire opinion-influencers 
and online commentators to follow political blogs and social networking 
sites to engage in online battles against “hostile” forces.13 However, the 
effectiveness of these strategies by the part-state remains limited. The 
coercive measures mostly invite resistance from the Internet users and 
the hired commentators do not have the capacity to provide persuasive 
arguments on rational grounds. Social media continues to grow beyond 
its control and represents a major source of support for the development 
of civil society.  
                                                 
13  In an annual national meeting of the information and propaganda sector in 
December 2012, Ho Quang Loi, head of information and propaganda of Ha-
noi’s Party Committee, disclosed that 900 online commentators had been mo-
bilised for blogosphere battle during the year. See Dao Tuan 2012, <http://lao 
dong.com.vn/chinh-tri/to-chuc-nhom-chuyen-gia-but-chien-tren-internet-985 
82.bld> (20 January 2013). 
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The Limit of Social Media in Impacting Elite  
Politics
While social media has enabled political participation at a new scope and 
scale, its implication for elite politics should not be exaggerated and 
should be treated with caution. It is often difficult to confirm the authen-
ticity and source of the information that spreads on social media. Thus, 
the social media is fertile ground for the spreading of politically motivat-
ed rumours. For example, in 2014, there was a lot of speculation on 
blogs and Facebook posts that Nguyen Bá Thanh, the populist politician 
at the forefront of the anti-corruption movement, had been poisoned by 
his political rivals, resulting in his death. There had been no trustworthy 
independent media to either confirm or disprove those conspiracy theo-
ries around his death. In 2015, the rumour about the sudden death of 
Phùng Quang Thanh, the incumbent minister of defence, had ignited a 
lot of curiosity and speculation on social media about his political rivals 
and their schemes (Nguyen Giang 2015). Even when the state media 
released pictures of his normal activities, the rumours did not stop.  
Public participation through social media is not always an active 
process. In an environment characterised by a lack of transparency, dis-
closed information on the sensitive issues to the party-state is often po-
litically purposeful. Thus, the social media can be manipulated by various 
political forces for their own purpose, while not necessarily representing 
the complete truth or even providing false information. One should not 
exclude the possibility that certain elements of the party-state have also 
been taking a hidden role in providing unconfirmed information on the 
social media in their own interest.  
While there are high hopes that social media can serve as a powerful 
tool to start social movements around issues related to inequality, injus-
tices, and environment, it has become more difficult to translate the 
reactions of the crowd on the social media into collective action in the 
physical sphere. Cases such as ‘6700 people for 6700 trees’ in Hanoi 
remain rare. Civil society activism is more likely to become more dynam-
ic if it does not directly challenge political authority, the interests of 
powerful institutions, or the personal interests of powerful individuals, 
both locally and nationally. Meaningful participation to influence the 
political process on social issues at a broader and deeper level requires 
more than just the spontaneous reactions and emotions of the partici-
pants in cyberspace. Trust and respect among the people interacting on 
the social media are often not the rules of game.  
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Conclusion 
Social media in Vietnam has been a major force in terms of enlarging the 
political space for public participation and increased interaction with the 
elite politics over the past few years. Thanks to technology, social media 
has enabled mass participation and rendered many of the traditional 
controls by the government, such as censorship, less effective. The as-
cendency of social networks has empowered many ordinary citizens with 
access to the Internet, as well as social actors, to voice their concerns and 
call for action despite the constraints imposed by legal restrictions.  
With the development of social media, the public has been better 
informed about key political and economic issues of public concern. 
Civil society action has shaped public responses and the way the state 
handles the outcomes of contentious politics. The ascendency of social 
media has taken civil society to a new level of development of civil socie-
ty of its impact and the level of organisation, coordination, and respon-
siveness by the people involved, despite some of its limits. With the use 
of social media, civil society actors can push the boundaries of what is 
acceptable to the state and claim an expanding political space. However, 
the social media does not serve as a level playing field for all actors, as 
one might think; it is still a political space characterised by inequality. 
Participants in this political space have different weights of influence. 
The party-state still can wield much infrastructural power to permeate 
the cyberspace, not just police it.  
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